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ABSTRACT
With the rise of the Internet of Things, embedded systems have become an inte-
gral part of life and can be found almost anywhere. Their prevalence and increased
interconnectivity has made them a prime target for malicious attacks. Today, the
vast majority of embedded devices are powered by ARM processors. To protect
their processors from attacks, ARM introduced a hardware security extension known
as TrustZone. It provides an isolated execution environment within the embedded
device in which to deploy various memory integrity and malware detection tools.
Even though Secure World can monitor the Normal World, attackers can attempt
to bypass the security measures to retain control of a compromised system. CacheKit
is a new type of rootkit that exploits such a vulnerability in the ARM architecture
to hide in Normal World cache from memory introspection tools running in Secure
World by exploiting cache locking mechanisms. If left unchecked, ARM processors
that provide hardware assisted cache locking for performance and time-critical appli-
cations in real-time and embedded systems would be completely vulnerable to this
undetectable and untraceable attack. Therefore, a new approach is needed to ensure
the correct use of such mechanisms and prevent malicious code from being hidden in
the cache.
CacheLight is a lightweight approach that leverages the TrustZone and Virtualiza-
tion extensions of the ARM architecture to allow the system to continue to securely
provide these hardware facilities to users while preventing attackers from exploiting
them. CacheLight restricts the ability to lock the cache to the Secure World of the
processor such that the Normal World can still request certain memory to be locked
into the cache by the secure operating system (OS) through a Secure Monitor Call
(SMC). This grants the secure OS the power to verify and validate the information
that will be locked in the requested cache way thereby ensuring that any data that
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remains in the cache will not be inconsistent with what exists in main memory for in-
spection. Malicious attempts to hide data can be prevented and recovered for analysis
while legitimate requests can still generate valid entries in the cache.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Today, ARM processors are used to power almost any technology that requires
digital intelligence. As of September 2016, ARM has shipped out more then 86 bil-
lion chips that are used to securely and efficiently power anything from “smart cities,
smart phones, supercomputers, cars, spacecraft, networking base stations and servers”
to Internet Of Things devices. [3] Having become a major driving force behind such
technologies, ARM has committed to providing the highest levels of security for their
processors. To achieve this, ARM introduced the TrustZone hardware security exten-
sions which provide an isolated Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for modern
and future security needs. The resources of this TEE, also known as the Secure World,
are separated from the rich, non-secure Normal World at the hardware level. Secure
World has privileged access to all system resources, while Normal World, where the
rich OS and untrusted applications run, can only access those resources allocated to
it.
Since the code in Secure World has the privilege to access Normal World mem-
ory and CPU registers, but not vice versa, system integrity checking and malware
detection tools can be installed in the Secure World to monitor the potentially com-
promised Normal World. Therefore, there have been various research efforts into using
the TEE provided by hardware to perform the detection of rootkits in the memory
[4] [5]. However, all these solutions depend on the ability of the high-privileged TEE
to have access over the entire physical memory and the malicious code being present
in memory. For example, Trustdump [6] is a forensic toolkit that has a small piece
of memory acquisition and integrity checking code stored in Secure World. From the
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TEE it can attempt to verify physical memory regions of the Normal World, beyond
the reach of the potentially corrupted system.
However, in order to avoid memory introspection tools running in the Secure World
(SW), more advanced rootkits are exploiting the fact that Secure World does not have
access to the Normal World (NW) cache. [1] In the ARM TrustZone architecture all
the resources are tagged with an additional bit (the NS bit) that indicates which
world they belong to. Although the Secure World has access to many of the Normal
World resources, the presence of the additional NS bit means that the Secure World
cannot access the Normal World cache. The authors of CacheKit refer to this
as a cache incoherence which they exploit to hide rootkits from introspection tools
running in the Secure World. By hiding the rootkit in Normal World cache, it is
able to avoid introspection from Secure World tools and therefore evade the primary
method of detection used against rootkits. This provides an unprecedented level of
stealth which could mean that a compromised system is never able to detect the
malicious software running silently in the cache.
First, to ensure that the rootkit is loaded only into cache and not memory where
it is susceptible to inspection tools, a technique called Cache-as-RAM is used. [7, 8]
However, with this newfound stealth there are some trade-offs that must be addressed.
The main goals of a rootkit are to remain:
1. Persistent in the system so as to allow the attacker continued unauthorized
access.
2. Undetected by any tools or countermeasures in place.
Cache is volatile memory and is often replaced to cache new memory regions as
needed by the system. While this makes CacheKit highly undetectable, it also
makes it unstable. If the rootkit cannot remain in the system long enough for the
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attacker to reach their desired goals then it is useless. Therefore, CacheKit takes
advantage of cache locking mechanisms, provided by the ARM Cortex processors at
the hardware level, to ensure that the rootkit remains in the cache without being
evicted by any replacement policy.
Finally, to ensure that the information of the rootkit can never be recovered, even
if the cache is successfully evicted, the virtual memory addresses associated with
the rootkit are remapped to unused reserved I/O space. This ensures that a flush
will result in the total loss of the rootkit and not it being written back to RAM
as normally expected by a cache eviction. Therefore, this novel attack known as
CacheKit requires 3 facilities to be able to avoid memory inspection from tools in
either world:
1. The ability to employ the Cache-as-RAM method so as not to load the rootkit
into RAM.
2. The ability to lock the rootkit in the cache such that it cannot be evicted.
3. The ability to re-map to a new physical address in reserved unused I/O such
that any eviction would result in the total loss of all potentially analyzable
data. [1]
This new-found level of stealthy attacks leaves many real-time and embedded sys-
tems that offer cache locking mechanisms exposed and vulnerable. Therefore, a new
defense approach is necessary to continue to provide these hardware facilities for tim-
ing and performance sensitive processes. Throughout this thesis, we study possible
solutions to determine the best approach to defending against such attacks. After
thorough research and experimentation, we design and implement CacheLight, a
lightweight approach for preventing malicious abuse of cache locking mechanisms.
This novel solution leverages both the TrustZone and Virtualization extensions in
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the ARM architecture to allow legitimate users to continue to utilize cache locking
while giving the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) the power to ensure system
security by controlling and verifying use of said mechanisms. In the next sections
of the paper, we provide some background on the TrustZone extensions, the ARM
cache and physical memory, and the CacheKit attack as well as related work. With
a strong background established, we delve into the process of designing and imple-
menting CacheLight. We implement our defense technique on top of the Genode
Operating System. We explore possible solutions using our new environment, but
after determining the necessity for valid cache locking, we arrive at the final solution
of CacheLight. We present the implementation of CacheLight, and evaluate it
in terms of performance and security.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND: ARM, CACHE AND TRUSTZONE
2.1 ARM Architecture
With the TrustZone Security Extensions enabled, an ARM processor has 9 modes
of operations. The modes, respective privileges of software executing in that mode,
and security states in which that mode can operate are summarized in Table 2.1
below.
Table 2.1: ARM Processor Modes
Processor Mode Privilege Level Security State
User (usr) PL0 Both
FIQ (fiq) PL1 Both
IRQ (irq) PL1 Both
Supervisor (svc) PL1 Both
Monitor (mon) PL1 Secure Only
Abort (abt) PL1 Both
Hypervisor (hyp) PL2 Non-Secure Only
Undefined (und) PL1 Both
System (sys) PL1 Both
The usr mode has privilege level 0 and it is where user space programs run. The
svc mode has privilege level 1 and is where most parts of the kernel run. It is also
importation to note that the mon mode has privilege level 1 but always runs in secure
state only.
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At the system level view, the AMRv7 architecture has 16 core registers when
Security Extensions are implemented. General-purpose 32-bit registers R0 - R7,
are the same across all modes. General-purpose 32-bit registers R8 - R12, are the
same across all modes except FIQ mode. In addition there are three 32-bit regis-
ters with special uses. The Stack Pointer (SP) and Link Register (LR) are banked
across all privileged modes except system mode. And finally, the Program Counter
PC which is not considered a general-purpose register in ARM. Additionally, the
Current Program Status Register CPSR holds processor status and control infor-
mation, including the current processor mode. The value of this register is copied and
saved upon entry in the respective Saved PSR by all modes except User and System.
This system level view is shown below in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: ARMv7 Core Registers
The ARM architecture supports coprocessors to extend the functionality of the
ARM processor. Each coprocessor has its own set of registers. Coprocessor instruc-
tions provide access to sixteen coprocessors in the ARMv7 architecture described as
CP0 - CP15. CP15 is called the System Control coprocessor and is reserved is reserved
for the control and configuration of the ARM processor system, including architecture
and feature identification. [9]
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2.2 ARM TrustZone
ARM Processors power billions of networked embedded devices around the world.
With a growing Internet of Things and emphasis on security ARM deployed a new
technology called TrustZone to provide hardware assisted security. TrustZone is a
set of hardware security extensions on the processor, memory, and peripherals that
ensure complete system isolation for running secure code. The isolated environment
is referred to as the Secure World while the Normal World is the name given to the
other environment where the OS and other programs run. Just as how we have user
and privileged mode in an operating system, these two hardware worlds interact in
much the same way. The Secure World is thought to oversee the Normal World as
it has higher access privileges. This means that the Secure World can access most of
the resources that belong to the Normal World. Normal World does not have access
to any of the resources available to the Secure World. Figure 2.2 shows the isolated
environments provided by TrustZone.
However, in hardware these worlds are meant to be completely independent and
thus the Secure World cannot access the Normal Worlds cache. To divide the two
worlds, CP15 has a Security Configuration Register (SCR) with a non-secure
(NS) bit that determines the security context of the processor. When the NS bit
is set, this indicates that the processor is in the Normal World and when it is cleared,
the processor is in Secure World. The two worlds are separated by adding this NS
control bit to all system resources. To isolate memory and I/O devices, the NS bit is
also added to each read and write channel of the main system bus. For memory, the
NS bit acts as a 33rd address bit such that there is a 32-bit physical address space
for each of normal and secure transactions. For I/O transactions, the NS bit acts
as a flag to indicate if the access attempt has the required privilege. [10] Monitor
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Figure 2.2: ARM TrustZone Security Extensions
Mode is responsible for handling world-switches. To enter monitor mode, the pro-
cess must execute a Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction, at which point monitor
mode handles the world switching and determines the necessary function or handler
to execute. [2]
2.3 ARM Cache
In general, caches can be divided into four types, based on whether the index and
tag bits correspond to physical or virtual addresses.
1. Physically indexed, physically tagged (PIPT) caches use the physical address
for both the index and the tag. While this is simple and avoids problems
with aliasing, it is also slow, as the physical address must be looked up in the
translation tables before that address can be looked up in the cache.
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2. Virtually indexed, virtually tagged (VIVT) caches use the virtual address for
both the index and the tag. This caching scheme can result in much faster
lookups, since it does not require accesses to the MMU. However, VIVT suffers
from aliasing problems, where several different virtual addresses may refer to
the same physical address, which severely complicates the sharing of caches.
3. Virtually indexed, physically tagged (VIPT) caches use the virtual address for
the index and the physical address in the tag. They are faster than PIPT caches
as the cache line can be looked up in parallel with the TLB translation, however
the tag cannot be compared until the physical address is available. While they
still face aliasing problems, the physical tag bits make sharing more manageable.
4. Physically indexed, virtually tagged (PIVT) caches are generally not imple-
mented.
In general, the ARM L1 instruction cache is VIPT for greater speed and since
instructions generally are not shared. However, the L1 data cache and any lower level
caches are generally PIPT, with some options for implementing them as VIPT. [11]
With the implementation of TrustZone technology, the processor cache is also
extended with an additional tag bit. This tag bit is used to record which world
made the memory access, or which world the line of cache belongs to. This makes
it so that the processor always knows which lines of cache belong to which world
and cache flushing between world switches is not necessary. The two worlds can
evict each others lines in the cache as needed. [9] However, it is possible to prevent
cache lines from being evicted by locking them. While this allows for performance
optimization, it also gives rise to the cache incoherence which CacheKit exploits to
hide from memory inspection tools. After the virtual address and physical address
translation has occurred in the Translation Lookaside Buffer, level 1 cache stores the
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memory data of the physical address and keeps the NS bit to indicate which world it
belongs to. This NS bit is set by hardware and it is not directly accessible by system
software. [12]
Through several experiments on the i.MX53 development board, Zhang et. al
determine that the addition of TrustZone introduces a cache inconsistency where each
world cannot access the other worlds cache content. Therefore, while the Secure World
cannot access the Normal Worlds cache content, though it can access the Normal
Worlds RAM. This is because the architecture tries to optimize the performance of
the implementation by separating cache lines based on the processor execution mode
with the NS bit. However, this means that cache lines in the Normal World are only
visible to the Normal World. While this ensures that the two worlds are independent,
this also means that this is a resource in the Normal World that security and forensic
tools in the Secure World cannot inspect unless it is flushed into RAM.
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Chapter 3
CACHEKIT ATTACK
CacheKit is a new type of rootkit that exploits a cache incoherence in the ARM
TrustZone architecture. [1] Dividing the two worlds completely results in a cache
incoherence where the contents of Secure and Normal World are different even if they
map to the same physical address. CacheKit exploits the fact that even though the
Secure World can access the memory of Normal World, the two worlds are separated
such that they cannot gain access to the others cache. There are three major steps
in establishing CacheKit: Loading, Locking, and Hiding. First, a technique known
as Cache-as-RAM is used to ensure that the rootkit is loaded only into cache of the
Normal World where it can avoid detection from the Secure World. [7] Then, the
ARM hardware support settings are exploited to keep the code persistent in cache as
long as possible. Finally, the translation tables are modified such that the malicious
code in cache maps to unused I/O addresses in physical memory so that if cache
content is flushed to RAM for inspection, the data is simply lost. This ensures that
even if the rootkit were to be flushed into memory for any reason, any trace of the
malicious code would be lost. [1]
3.1 Cache Incoherence
Through several experiments on the i.MX53 development board, the authors de-
termine that the addition of TrustZone introduces a cache inconsistency where each
world cannot access the other worlds cache content. Therefore, while the secure world
cannot access the normal worlds cache content, though it can access the normal worlds
RAM. This is because the architecture tries to optimize the performance of the im-
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plementation by separating cache lines based on the processor execution mode with
the NS bit. However, this means that cache lines in the normal world are only visible
to the normal world. While this ensures that the two worlds are independent, this
also means that this is a resource in the normal world that security and forensic tools
in the secure world cannot inspect unless it is flushed into RAM.
3.2 CacheKit: Loading
Once the cache incoherence in TrustZone has been confirmed it can be exploited
to conceal a rootkit within the normal world cache that avoids memory inspection
techniques. In the ARM architecture, the only way to read or write a cache line is
to have the processor read from or write to virtual memory. Therefore, to load the
rootkit into cache the CacheKit module must first enable caching on memory. This
is done by setting the paging table memory attribute as WriteBack. The WriteBack
configuration ensures that load register (LDR) instructions trigger a cache line fill.
The key of cache loading is to ensure that data is loaded to cache and cache only,
the rootkit should not be stored in RAM at any point as it would make it visible to
memory inspection.
Figure 3.1: Exploiting the Cache-as-RAM Technique
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Figure 3.1 shows how, using the Cache-as-Ram technique, it may be possible to
have code in cache that is not consistent with what is in main memory, thereby
allowing an attacker to modify benign code in the cache with malicious code without
it being written back to memory right away.
3.3 CacheKit: Locking
The Cortex-A8 processor allows system software to lock up to seven cache ways
out of the total eight ways. This ability to maintain the code persistently in cache
is essential as cache is very volatile. Once the rootkit is loaded, it should remain
in memory as long as possible so an attacker can maintain control over the infected
system. While using Cache-as-RAM enables us to better hide the malware it also
means that the code can survive for a reasonable amount of time to make it useful.
First, the cache corresponding to all the memory addresses to be locked in cache
will need to be flushed out. Second, the cache way to be used is unlocked and
the other ways are locked. This means that any cache fills made by the LDR and
STR instructions will be made to the way that has been designated for the rootkit.
Lastly, once the rootkit has been loaded into cache the way that has been reserved
for the rootkit is locked and the rest of the cache is unlocked. Consequently, the
implementation of Cache-as-RAM to store the rootkit gives it exceptional stealth as
it can no longer be detected by memory inspection tools. However, there is a trade-off
in storing the rootkit in cache. Cache is very volatile and even though cache lines
can be locked with hardware control, they will still respond to cache maintenance
instructions if they are called. Therefore, when a cache flush is called the contents
of the rootkit will indeed be written out to memory. While mapping the cache to
I/O address space does mean that an attacker can maintain stealth by destroying
the data since no backup memory exists, it also means that they lose the rootkit if
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it is ever flushed from cache. Since the effectiveness of a rootkit depends on how
long it can remain hidden in the system this is a major trade-off between stealth and
persistence. Therefore, for CacheKit to be most effective it is imperative to have an
environment where data can persist in cache. Upon conducting a search of the kernel
source code the authors determine that there is only one function that the kernel
could call to clean the entire cache, thereby evicting the rootkit. However, it is never
used in the uniprocessor deployment which makes the i.MX53 particularly vulnerable
to a CacheKit attack as persistence can be guaranteed at least until power cycling.
3.4 CacheKit: Hiding
Having successfully loaded and stored the rootkit in cache, CacheKit must now
address the two main issues of remaining concealed. The first problem is that even
when locked, the cache lines they are still responsive to cache maintenance instruc-
tions. As stated, ARMv7 provides various cache maintenance instructions that can
cause the contents of the cache to be written out to memory. This is dangerous
because if the malicious code is flushed to memory then it becomes detectable to
memory inspection techniques. Similarly, the second problem has to do with writing
back to memory and introspection from the normal world kernel. Detection methods
that sequentially map each physical page into the kernel memory space would still be
able to read the cache. Therefore, the idea of mapping the cache lines to unused phys-
ical I/O address space is proposed to resolve these issues with direct cache locking.
The authors refer to this newly mapped space as CacheKit Space.
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Figure 3.2: Hiding the Rootkit in the Cache
As shown in Figure 3.2, the key is to find the memory allocation of the system in
question and determine which part of the address space is used for I/O devices. In
32-bit ARM the convention is to have the first 2GB of memory mapped to I/O space.
Furthermore, in the i.MX53 development board it is found that the address range
between 0x13000000 to 0x15000000 belongs to reserved, unused I/O space. Therefore,
any access requests to this area are redirected to peripheral bus. CacheKit takes
advantage of this and carves out this space for potential flushes by reconfiguring it as
memory space using the Cache-as-RAM technique. Now, all read and write operations
are redirected to the cache of the processor. This newly configured CacheKit Space
is neither backed by RAM nor any real I/O device. Therefore, should the malicious
code ever be evicted by a cache clean or flush there is no physical device that will
respond to the memory write. This ensures that upon cache eviction, instead of being
written to memory where it can be discovered the malicious code is simply lost with
no error, response, or detection, as though it had never existed. This allows the
intentions and operations of the rootkit to remain unknown and untraced, perhaps
for future re-loading.
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Through several tests the authors are able to show that the methods of loading,
locking and hiding the rootkit in cache are effective. Several tests indicate that
CacheKit is not detectable by memory inspection tools run in the secure world.
Additionally, the DMA-based hardware forensic tool is also unable to detect the
rootkit in the cache. Therefore, the methods employed by the CacheKit module
effectively exploit cache incoherence behavior in TrustZone to hide the rootkit from
memory inspection techniques.
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Chapter 4
CACHELIGHT
In this chapter of the thesis, we discuss various solution approaches investigated.
Generally, security measures can be broken down in to three categories; detection,
prevention, and response. The focus of this thesis is on detection and prevention. We
compare the benefits and limitations of each approach and eventually conclude that
the approach we name CacheLight provides the best solution.
4.1 Na¨ıve Approaches
4.1.1 Prevention
First, we focus on preventing rootkits from hiding in Normal World cache. Accord-
ing to the ARM Technical reference manual for the Cortex-A8 [2], the CL determines
whether or not cache locking can be done in the Normal World. If the CL is set (to
1) then cache locking is available in both worlds. However, if the CL bit is cleared
(to 0) then cache locking is only available in the Secure World. Attempting to use
registers associated with cache locking, namely the L2 Lock Down Register, an un-
defined instruction exception is thrown. Therefore, this provides a simple and direct
solution to preventing CacheKit attacks by disabling the cache locking capabilities
in the Normal World and only allowing trusted applications running in privileged SW
levels to lock cache entries. While this would prevent such attacks entirely because
the rootkits would no longer be able to remain persistent in cache, it also limits a lot
of what NW users can accomplish in their applications.
17
Therefore, disabling cache locking may not be an option. Many modern processors
feature cache locking mechanisms to allow for finer control of cache eviction policies
and thereby improving the cache hit rate. This can have a considerable impact on
the performance of a system if managed correctly. [13] For this reason, a wide variety
of processors across different manufacturers and processor families offer this option.
Some of ARMs Cortex and ARM11 processors allow for way locking in which locking
is available at the granularity of ways of a set-associative cache. Line locking is a
more fine-grained approach where it is possible to have a different number of locked
lines in different sets of the cache; Intels XScale, the ARM9 family, and BlackFin 5xx
family processors support this kind of locking mechanism. [14]
Originally, cache locking was designed to offer timing predictability for real-time
systems, where techniques focused mostly on improving worst-case execution time.
However, recent research has expanded this use to better performance of general
embedded systems by improving average-case execution time. While the improvement
can be significant, there is also the risk that an improper implementation will end up
negatively impacting performance, therefore careful management is essential to fully
realize the potential of cache locking. [15] Several techniques have been developed to
try to use cache locking to optimize performance as categorized by Mittal. [15]
Many different mechanisms have been developed, each with their own benefits
and limitations, to try to leverage cache locking to the fullest. These include both
dynamic and static cache locking as well as partial and full cache locking. [16] There
are also works that focus on guaranteeing a minimized predictable average worst-
case execution time for embedded systems by exploring different profiles. [13, 14] In
fact, the i.MX53 was chosen because it features an ARM Cortex-A8 processor which
supports cache locking.
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Considering how important cache locking can be in both real-time and embedded
systems across so many processors we cannot assume that disabling the mechanism
is an option.
4.1.2 Detection
Therefore, we move to detecting rootkits hidden in the cache.Given that it is
most likely a part of a real-time or general embedded system that depends on cache
locking to give critical processes timing predictability or the ability to meet stringent
performance requirements, we cannot move this functionality to the Secure World.
Not only would it affect the timing with the need for world switching but it would
also greatly broaden the Trusted Code Base, defeating the purpose of having a small,
isolated, trusted environment. Therefore, it is necessary to enable cache locking in
the Normal World and thus we must be able to detect malicious attempts my a
potentially compromised Normal World OS.
Originally, we had considered that in order to detect an attack, we would need
not only the attempt to lock the cache but also the remapping of a virtual address
to a physical address that does not correspond to system memory. That is, these two
fundamental necessities of CacheKit would be enough to determine that a malicious
user is attempting to hide code in the Normal World cache. CacheKit prevents its
data from being retrieved for forensic purposes by mapping to the physical region of
reserved unused I/O so that if the cache is ever flushed, the malicious code is simply
lost and cannot be analyzed. However, these two functionalities together make for
a very specific signature that can most definitely signal malicious activity. This is
because while some time critical programs may need instructions or data to be locked
in th cache, we would never need anything outside the System Memory Region to be
locked.
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The first step is to detect if Normal World has attempted to lock the cache by
reading the value of the L2 Lock Down Register. Anything other than 0 would
indicate that one or more cache ways are locked. If we are able to then find a
page table entry that maps a virtual address to a physical address outside of the
System Memory Region, we would be able to detect a rootkit hiding in the cache.
This would require a page-table walk, because we have to check all entries to ensure
completeness. While a page-table walk is expensive, we would only need to execute
it when a lock is detected. In this manner, we would then be able to force a cache
flush or invalidation to trigger a write back to memory. To ensure that we are able
to retrieve the malicious code we also have to modify the virtual address that has an
invalid mapping to a new, valid memory region that we have reserved from Secure
World for memory inspection. However, we find that this approach will be ineffective
in retrieving the malicious data in the cache because even if we are able to re-map the
virtual address to a valid physical address, the L2 cache in the ARM Architecture is
Physically Indexed, Physically Tagged. This means that once the re-mapped address
has been loaded into the cache, it is already too late retrieve the data. This approach
would only work with a processor that supports both cache locking and VIVT caches.
In the ARM Architecture for the Cortex-A8, the L2 cache is Physically Indexed,
Physically Tagged (PIPT). [2] This means that the tag and index bits stored in the
cache to identify which memory address the cache line maps to are taken from the
physical address and not the virtual address.
As shown in Figure 4.1, even if we are successful in re-mapping the virtual address
to a valid physical address, once we flush the cache the write to memory will be done
according to the tag and index bits stored with the respective cache lines. Therefore,
once the rootkit has been stored in the cache with the modified physical address that
points to reserved, unused I/O, any eviction will always be done to this location.
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Figure 4.1: PIPT Caches Prevent the Retrieval of Hidden Data
CacheKit creates a ”black-hole” situation where once it is in the cache, there is no
retrieving it because there is no way to access the tag and index bits of the cache
other than with perhaps a JTAG Debugger. Therefore, the only solution left is to
develop a defense mechanism to prevent rootkits, or any malicious code, from being
loaded into the cache in the first place. This makes a detection solution considerably
difficult. However, by leveraging TrustZone technology, prevention is still possible.
4.2 CacheLight Approach
In this section of the paper we present our CacheLight approach, a defense
mechanism for preventing malicious software from inhabiting the cache for any sig-
nificant period of time. We leverage the TrustZone Security Extensions to ensure
that even if an attacker is able to briefly compromise the Normal World kernel, they
will not be able to leave behind any malicious code in the Normal World Cache. The
main idea is to go expand on the most simple solution of disabling the ability to lock
the cache by clearing the CL bit. However, we still want user programs that have
time-sensitive operations in real-time and embedded systems to be able to make use
of the cache locking mechanism. Therefore, we implement CacheLight as a Secure
World kernel function that can be called from Normal World kernel to have the Secure
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OS perform the locking for the Non-Secure OS. This means that while users can still
take advantage of the benefits of cache locking for legitimate purposes, the Secure
OS can have better control over what gets locked in the cache and perform integrity
checking to prevent malicious code from being loaded in. In order to achieve this, we
have to switch from a data abort to an SMC which the Normal World can call and
the Secure World can then handle.
4.2.1 Passing Arguments to Secure World
The first step is to determine what arguments the pass with the SMC to Secure
World. In order to service the call, the SMC Handler in Secure World must know:
1. OP Code: The operation code to determine what the SMC is for and properly
handle the request.
2. VA: The virtual address that corresponds to the data that the NW wants to
lock in cache.
3. LockDownReg: the L2 Lockdown Register value to be used. This determines
which cache ways the Normal World wishes to lock.
4. Size: the size or amount of data to be loaded into the cache from the base
address (VA).
With these three arguments we have all the information we need to load and lock
the data into the cache on behalf of the Normal World. More importantly, the data
must first be loaded into physical memory by the Normal World, which ensures that
whatever is being loaded into the cache is consistent with what appears in RAM and
therefore exposed to memory inspection tools.
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4.2.2 CacheLight Work-flow
Once we have establish the necessary parameters to pass to Secure World, we can
detail the necessary work-flow, or steps, of the approach as shown in Figure 4.2:
Figure 4.2: Work-flow Diagram for CacheLight
Secure World has all the necessary information to first verify that the request to
lock memory is valid by ensuring only memory regions allocated to Normal World are
being requested. Furthermore, all the data must first be loaded into main memory
by the Normal World, and is therefore available to inspection, should Secure World
find an invalid PA is given. Otherwise, it can then go through the process of servicing
legitimate requests and locking the requested memory in cache. The steps for this
case are detailed in the following sections.
4.2.3 Virtual to Physical Address Translation
Virtual address translation is provided by way of the Memory Management Unit.
In ARMv7 the MMU works with the L1 and L2 memory system to translate virtual
addresses to physical addresses and controls accesses to and from external memory.
Therefore, it is enhanced with security extensions and multiprocessor extensions to
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provide address translation and access permission checks. Virtual-to-physical address
mappings and memory attributes are defined in main memory as page tables; each
World has it’s own set of page tables and TLB identifiers to remove the requirement
for context switch TLB flushes. [2]
Therefore, the first step in preventing rootkits from being loaded into cache is to
translate the given VA to the PA. The ARMv7 Architecture provides VA to PA ad-
dress translation operations using registers from CP15. There is a Physical Address
Register (PAR) that holds the PA after a successful translation or the source of the
abort after an unsuccessful translation. It is a read/write register banked in Secure
and Non-secure states and accessible in privileged modes only. [2] Figure 4.3 shows
the format of the PAR register.
Figure 4.3: Physical Address Register in ARM [2]
Notice that bits [31:12] contain the the physical address after a successful trans-
lation. The rest of the bits are taken directly from bits [11:0] of the virtual address.
This gives us a complete PA to use. To make use of this register for our address
translation we do VA to PA translation in the other Secure or Non-secure state. The
purpose of the VA to PA translation in the other Secure or Non-secure state is to
translate the address with the current virtual mapping in the Non-secure state while
the core is in the Secure state. [2] To access the VA to PA translation in the other
Secure or Non-secure state, we write CP15 c7 with Opcode2 set to 4 for privileged
read permission. In this manner, the given virtual address will be translated using
the Normal World’s translation tables and we can retrieve a PA to work with.
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4.2.4 Verifying Memory Contents
Once we have the physical address we are able to determine it is a valid address
within the system memory. We can check if the PA maps to I/O memory region,
in which case we know we should not allow such an address to be locked in the
cache. Depending on the implementation, it is also possible to check that the PA
is withing the memory region allocated to the Normal World by the Secure World
for a much better, tighter security check. At this point we can flush the cache and
run the memory inspection tools of the Secure World to retrieve and analyze the
malicious code that the attacker attempted to leave behind. Since in this scheme
only the Secure World is allow to perform cache locking, we are able to ensure that
any memory that will remain in the cache does not differ to what is in RAM and
thus we can be certain that there is no incoherence from what we are inspecting in
the RAM and what the system is executing in the cache.
On the other hand, if the request is for a valid physical address then the secure
world must be able to perform the loading and locking of the requested memory region
into the specified cache way. The details of this case are discussed in the following
sections.
4.2.5 Enabling and Disabling Interrupts
The first step is to disable interrupts so that we cannot be pre-empted. To lock
the given memory, and only the given memory, in the given cache way(s) the locking
process must not be interrupted. Therefore it is imperative that this code be within
a non-preemtible critical section. Once the locking is complete, Secure World can
enable interrupts again.
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4.2.6 Mapping Normal World Memory to Secure World
With the virtualization extensions active in both worlds, it is necessary to map a
virtual address in the Secure World to the given physical address from the Normal
World. This means that the Normal World memory must be mapped in the Secure
World as well. Memory that both worlds have access to is referred to as World-Shared
Memory. World-Shared Memory is denigrated as non-secure since NW can only make
non-secure accesses while SW can make both secure and non-secure accesses. Now
that valid VA entries exist for Normal World physical addresses, Secure World can use
these to load the requested memory region and thereby create the cache line entires
on behalf of the Normal World. Given the PA that the Normal World would like to
lock, a helper function is defined to build the offset within the physical Normal World
memory and add that offset to the virtual start address of the mapping within the
Secure World kernel, returning the Secure World VA for the specified PA. Since the
processor is in Monitor Mode, this VA can be used to create cache entries tagged as
Non-Secure that will generate cache hits when the Normal World attempts to access
said memory, effectively allowing the Secure World to create locked cache entries for
the Normal World.
4.2.7 World-Shared Memory
As mentioned in Chapter 1, all addresses are tagged with an additional NS bit to
indicate what mode the entry belongs to. Normal World is only able to access entries
tagged with an NS bit equal to 1. Therefore, when we load the data into the cache we
have to ensure that it is tagged with NS = 1 so that Normal World will have a cache
hit when attempting to access the physical address that corresponds to said data.
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Figure 4.4 shows how the memory system of a theoretical ARM processor might
handle the state associated with Security Extensions when accessing the memory
system. [12]
Figure 4.4: Memory System for a Theoretical ARM Core
First, the core processing logic attempts a data load, a data store, or an instruc-
tion prefetch. The hardware passes the Virtual Address (VA) and the current world
(Non-Secure Table Identifier, or NSTID) to the TLB to enable it to perform address
translation. the NSTID is passed by the hardware and depends on the current state
of the processor, not the NS bit. In this case the NSTID will represent a Secure World
entry. [12]
Then, the TLB loads the physical address and the NS-bit associated with the
VA and NSTID it was passed, performing a page-table walk and forcing NS=1 if
NSTID=1 if necessary. The translation tables are responsible for keeping track of the
NS bit and whether the VA resolves to a secure or non-secure physical address. [9]
The TLB then passes this information to the cache to perform the actual data or
instruction access. If the Secure World has mapped the non-secure memory containing
the data the Normal World wants to lock in its translation tables, then the Secure
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World can directly access the non-secure cache lines. Therefore, a Normal World
application can pass data to the Secure World though any level in the cache hierarchy.
This enables a high performance system in comparison to solutions that require cached
data to be flushed out of the cache and in to external memory. [12]
Therefore, when we later on perform the loading and locking of memory the entires
of the cache will we tagged with an NS bit of 1 rather than zero. This means that when
the Normal World attempts to access this address that it requested Secure World to
load into the cache for it, it will generate a cache hit. Normal World will find a
cache entry that matches the PA translation with an NS bit of 1, indicating that this
memory is designated for Normal World use and will return the data from that cache
line. This also means that Secure World can gain access to the Normal World cache
if it creates the necessary translation table entries by implementing World-Shared
Memory
4.2.8 Locking NW Memory Into Cache From SW
Finally, we can now perform the loading and locking of the memory in the Secure
World exactly as it would have been done in the Normal World. We pass the virtual
address, the value to use for the L2 Lockdown Register, and the size of the data to
load as arguments. Therefore, Secure World has all the information required to load
and lock data to the requested cache ways. By implementing World-Shared Memory,
the Secure World can issue non-secure memory accesses that create non-secure cache
entires for the Normal World. When control is returned to the Normal World, the
legitimate process will be able to access the time-critical section locked in the cache
as intended. Therefore, this mechanism gives the Secure World a lot of power and
control over what gets loaded into the cache, allowing it to ensure that there is no
incoherency with what is stored in memory and what is stored in Normal World cache.
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4.3 Comparing Approaches
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no other defense mechanisms pro-
posed against these kinds of attacks. Therefore, to evaluate the best solution, we
provide a comparison of the three approaches introduced here.
Figure 4.5: Comparison of Different Defense Approaches
We conclude that, while there is room for further work, the most robust and effec-
tive solution is the CacheLight approach. In the following chapters we implement
and evaluate CacheLight in terms of security and performance.
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Chapter 5
CACHELIGHT IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Genode: A Secure World OS
To defend against this new type of attack we first replicate the original proto-
type scenario on the i.MX53 Development Board. Once functionality was verified,
we moved to deploy the defense environment. The first step is to have a Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE) in the Secure World. After careful consideration we
decided to use the open-source Genode Project which supports the i.MX53. Genode
provides support for various Normal World operating systems, hardware platforms,
and scenarios. The scenario we choose was designed for the i.MX53 with TrustZone
hardware capabilities. As shown in Figure 5.1, Genode runs in the Secure World and
deploys a VMM in which it then boots a modified Linux 2.6.35 simple kernel in the
Normal World.
The Linux kernel was modified such that certain kernel functions could handle
world switches using an SMC call to the Secure World. The CacheKit attack
module can then be cross-compiled for the new target kernel in the Normal World
and deployed on the new Genode environment. [17]
5.2 Building and Deploying The Environment
Using Genode 18.02, we build the Genode Truztone Virtual Machine Monitor
(TZ-VMM) scenario for the i.MX53 board. This build generates an bootable image
for the target board as specified in the configuration file. The next step is to obtain
the necessary bootloader provided by Genode Labs and generate the boot image.
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Figure 5.1: TrustZone VMM Scenario in Genode
Finally, a bootable SD card is prepared for the board using both the boot image and
the Genode image generated earlier. Now we have the Genode TZ-VMM running on
the i.MX53 development board. The details of using and understanding Genode and
all of the different scenarios can be found in their Foundations Book. [18]
5.3 Deploying the CacheKit Attack
We replicated CacheKit on the i.MX53 development board, which features a
single ARM Cortex A8 processor. The project is implemented as a kernel module
that once installed on the board can use the cache manipulation tools in ARM to
successfully load, lock, and conceal the rootkit in cache.Next, we must be able to
cross-compile the CacheKit attack module against the new modified target kernel
running in the Normal World. Unfortunately, the modified kernel is provided as a
pre-compiled image in the Genode repository. Therefore, we obtain the source code
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of the modified kernel and create our own build. This then gave us a target to cross-
compile the CacheKit attack module against to be able to deploy it on the new
environment.
5.4 Disabling Locking
Now that we have our prototype set up we deploy the attack module and find that
it is unable to perform the hiding functions in the new environment. After examining
the Genode source code for the Secure World we find that upon initialization the
CL bit of the Non-Secure Access Control Register (NACR) is cleared as shown
in Figure 5.2.
/∗ Non−Secure Access Contro l Reg i s t e r ∗/
ARM CP15 REGISTER 32BIT( Nsacr , c1 , c1 , 0 , 2 ,
/∗ Co−proces sor 10 acces s ∗/
struct Cpnsae10 : B i t f i e l d <10, 1> { } ;
/∗ Co−proces sor 11 acces s ∗/
struct Cpnsae11 : B i t f i e l d <11, 1> { } ;
struct Ns smp : B i t f i e l d <18, 1> { } ;
) ;
Figure 5.2: Genode Does Not Enable Locking in Normal World by Default.
Therefore, when the kernel module attempts to lock the cache, an undefined in-
struction exception is thrown by the system as shown in Figure 5.3.
As shown in Figure 5.3, when the attack module attempts to access the L2 Lock
Down Register to lock down a cache way, an undefined instruction exception is
thrown and the module terminates. Notice also that when we read the NACR the
value is given as initialized Genode where only access to co-processors 10 and 11 are
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CacheKit : Cache Module Loaded .
Pr in t ing System Config :
CL ( b i t 16) va lue : 0x00000C00
Attempt to s e t CL b i t :
CL ( b i t 16) va lue : 0x00000C00
Read L2 Lockdown Reg i s t e r : 0x00000000
Write L2 Lockdown Reg i s t e r :
I n t e r n a l e r r o r : Oops − undef ined i n s t r u c t i o n : 0
Modules l i nked in : CacheKit (+)
CPU: 0 Not ta in t ed
PC i s at writeL2LockedDownRegister+0x0/0 xc [ CacheKit ]
Figure 5.3: Cache Locking Disabled in Normal World
enabled. [17] This means that the CL bit is set to 0 and thus the attack module is
rightfully denied the ability to lock down the cache. This is a very simple and di-
rect method for preventing rootkits from hiding in the Normal World cache to avoid
memory introspection.
5.5 Detection Attempt
For the detection implementation, we enable cache locking in the Normal World
for Genode. We then deploy the CacheKit attack module and attempt to detect
when the Normal World locks the cache and determine whether or not the attempt
is malicious. The first step is to be able to determine if the Normal World has locked
the cache.
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Figure 5.4: World Switching on Data Abort Exception
In the Genode architecture, a world switch from Normal to Secure World happens
only when an SMC call is made or when a Data Abort Exception occurs. A data
abort exception occurs when the Normal World attempts to access a physical memory
region associated with a device that the rich OS in the Normal World was not given
access to. [17] The data abort triggers a switch back to Secure World where the
trusted OS can produce a signal to handle the exception and emulate the device if
access is warranted for the Normal World. The signal handler executes at a privilege
level in the Secure World. The execution in the trusted kernel following a data abort,
highlighted in red in Figure 5.4, provides a great opportunity to check Normal World
behavior with ease of testing. Therefore, we chose to deploy our detection code upon
a data abort since the L2 Lockdown Register requires privileged access. Before the
signal is sent, we check for locked cache lines by reading the L2 Lockdown Register
and are able to determine is the cache is locked. The signal is sent only if the value
of the register is zero. [2] Any other value would indicate locking and we must handle
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and verify this before we allow the Normal World to continue. However, we are unable
to verify malicious code was indeed hiding in cache or retrieve any of the data for
analysis because the cache is PIPT.
5.6 Deploying the CacheLight Defense
The Normal World kernel was modified such that certain kernel functions could
handle world switches using an Secure Monitor Call (SMC) to the Secure World.
According to their documentation, there were six different SMC’s added to the Linux
kernel. [19] However, upon closer inspection of the current release, Genode 18.02,
there are actually only 4 SMC’s that are implemented. Furthermore, they do not
follow the ARM SMC Calling Convention [20], but rather implement their own,
simpler version of handling SMC’s. In Genode, an SMC is still used to generate a
synchronous exception that is handled by Secure Monitor code running in Exception
Level 3 (EL3). The Secure Monitor Mode handles the world switching and then
hands off the handling of the exception to the Virtual Machine Monitor running as
an unprivileged user-level component in Genode. However, instead of using the ARM
Calling Convention, since there are only four different calls implemented, the function
to perform is simply passed as an argument in register R0. Registers R1-R10 are then
used to pass any necessary arguments to the Secure World. Upon a world-switch the
Monitor will save the state of the Virtual Machine, including these registers, so that
the Secure World can have access to them. The VMM then simply checks the value
in R0 to determine what function the Normal World needs it to perform for the SMC
and expects any relevant arguments in the other registers. [19] This makes it fairly
simple for us to add and define our own, fifth, SMC for a request to Secure World to
lock memory in the cache. The table below shows the different SMC’s that Genode
had already implemented with the addition of our own ”LOCK” SMC with code 4.
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Table 5.1: SMC Implementation in Modified Linux
SMC Number Function
0 FRAMEBUFFER
1 INPUT
2 SERIAL
3 BLOCK
4 LOCK
As shown in Table 5.1 our SMC has a function code of 4, this is passed through
register R0 and is used to determine what function the Secure World needs to perform
and the respective arguments in the remaining registers. In our case, we pass the
following arguments:
1. R1 is the virtual address to be loaded and locked in the cache.
2. R2 contains the lock down register value to be used. This determines which
cache ways the Normal World wishes to lock
3. R3 the size or amount of data to be loaded into the cache from the base address
in R1
With these three arguments we have all the information we need to load and lock
the data into the cache on behalf of the Normal World. More importantly, we have
the location of the data before it gets stored in the cache which allows us to regulate
what can be locked into the Normal World cache. Once the request is handled by
Genode, it restores the VM’s state and switches back to Normal World operations.
After we have implemented an SMC for CacheLight in the Genode core, we
need to define what happens once it is called by the Linux kernel. The SMC would
be called whenever the Normal World has some code that needs to be locked in the
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cache. The Normal World would load the operation code, virtual address, value for
the lock down register, and size of data to be loaded into the respective registers and
perform an SMC. Once Genode reaches the exception handling for the call, we need
to be able to create an entry in the cache with the data requested by the Normal
World that is accessible by Normal World. The general algorithm for CacheLight
is detailed below:
Algorithm 1 CacheLight Algorithm
1: function Handle LOCK SMC( VA, LockReg, size)
2: PA← virt to phys in other world(VA)
3: if PA < NONSECURE RAM BASE || PA > NONSECURE RAM END
then
4: Run Memory Introspection Tools
5: else
6: Disable Interrupts
7: Get VA mapping in Secure World
8: Lock given memory region in cache
9: Enable Interrupts
Overall, the entire process is implemented as roughly 200 lines of C and assembly
code in the Secure World kernel which is a minimal increase in the Trusted Code Base
(TCB) of the Secure World.
Genode utilizes the ARM Virtualization Extensions for the TZ-VMM scenario. [21]
Therefore, to establish World-Shared Memory, the Genode bootstrap process is mod-
ified to map the RAM region that is later allocated to the Normal World VM to a
designated virtual address space in the Secure World. Once defined, the mapping can
be added in the Platform constructor of the bootstrap process to create the page table
entries in the Secure World for the Normal World RAM space, effectively creating
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World-Shared Memory. The entries are created with the necessary flags, among them
the NS bit that indicates the virtual addresses resolve to non-secure physical space.
Once we deploy CacheLight, we are able to detect whenever the CacheKit
module is attempting to lock malicious code into the cache. By doing security checks
on the PA being locked into cache, CacheLight can detect anomalous behavior and
if needed deploy inspection tools. If the attempt to lock the cache is malicious, it can
then flush the caches and run memory introspection tools to determine the nature of
the attack and retrieve any relevant data for forensic analysis. On the other hand,
if the request is determined to be legitimate, CacheLight can service it by taking
advantage of world-shared memory.
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Chapter 6
RELATED WORK
Overtime, rootkits and the methods for detecting and defending against them have
been in an evolutionary race of hide and seek. Originally, persistent rootkits needed
to modify nonvolatile storage to survive system power cycles which meant that file
integrity checking tools could effectively detect them. [22] Therefore, rootkits switched
to reside only in the operating system kernel memory to defeat this storage-based
detection. To detect this new type of rootkit, defenders acquire the system memory
using a dedicated secure coprocessor [23] or physical hardware [24]. In their search
to acquire higher root privileges, attackers have developed several different rootkits.
Virtual machine based rootkits (VMBR) insert a customized malicious hypervisor
beneath the currently running operating system. [25] Firmware based rootkits infect
the firmware on I/O devices [26] or the system BIOS. [27]
As their counterpart, new hardware and software rootkit detectors with higher
privilege are also proposed. Hypervisors are commonly used to introspect the un-
trusted operating system [28]. However, vulnerabilities are frequently found in the
hypervisors. This gave rise to the use of hardware features, such as security exten-
sions in various processors. In this paper, we cover ARM TrustZone, however, each
developer has their own set of hardware security extensions. For example, AMD has
SVM [29] and Intel provides TXT [30]. These hardware features provide a trusted
execution environment (TEE) with guaranteed isolation. The TEE provides an en-
vironment with the highest privilege that defenders can claim as their own as seen
with TrustZone. CacheKit seeks to exploit weaknesses in these new hardware de-
fense features to evade detection by the OS kernel. Another proposed design that
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has much the same goals is Shadow Walker, as it exploits the I-TLB and D-TLB
coherency problem in the Intel architecture to hide the rootkits. [31] There is also
an implementation called Cloaker that was used as one of the comparisons in Ta-
ble 6.1 for CacheKits efficiency. Cloaker can hide its presence by locking the page
translation it altered in the translation look-aside buffer. [32] However, we note that
CacheKit provides a new level of stealth as it is able to evade physical memory
inspection by hiding in the Normal World cache.
Table 6.1: Comparisons Between CacheKit and Other Attacks with Respect to
Various Existing Detection Methods [1]
Detection Methods User Kernel VMBR SMMR Cloaker CacheKit
App level detection YES NO NO YES NO NO
OS level detection YES NO NO NO NO NO
VMM level detection YES YES YES NO NO NO
Coprocessor Based YES YES YES NO NO NO
TEE Based YES YES YES NO NO NO
Physical Memory Check YES YES YES YES YES NO
CacheKit is the only one able to evade the physical memory check. Furthermore,
by mapping the cache lines to unused I/O space we ensure that the malicious code
cannot be examined. In the worst case, it is evicted and then destroyed before it can be
inspected and analyzed. This prototype is implemented on the i.MX53 development
board and thus the immediate and complete application of the concept is limited to
similar single Cortex-A8 processor systems. While this is only a subset of all ARM
processors, it still poses a major threat as a nearly undetectable rootkit mechanism
in embedded systems. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no defense
mechanisms proposed for this kind of attack.
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Chapter 7
FUTURE WORK
While this initial implementation of CacheLight shows great potential, there is still
much work and refinement to be done. Most notably is more quantitative performance
analysis of CacheLight. We need to collect data to determine the exact performance
impact of CacheLight on the system based on the size of the data being loaded and
the amount of cache to be locked, similar to the analysis performed in CacheKit.
Further implementation independent testing is also necessary to ascertain and prove
the process for tagging entries in the cache with the NS bit. Additionally, there are
further applications and checks for which CacheKit could be leveraged to tighten
security. For example, limiting or regulating how much of the cache a request can
lock.
Furthermore, there is the case where a rootkit is loaded, but not locked, in the
cache with a remapped address so the attempt fails. However, this attempt would not
be retrievable for analysis, therefore, in such cases valuable forensic data is lost about
the attack and attacker. Perhaps there could be work done to expand the robustness
of the approach in such cases.
Finally, there is still more work that can be done on the response after an at-
tack is detected and verified. Looking deeper into the what inspection tools to run
in case CacheLight flags potential malicious code and the appropriate response
mechanisms to employ if the tool does find malicious code in memory.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSION
In this paper we present CacheLight, a lightweight approach to preventing mali-
cious use of cache locking mechanisms while allowing time-critical applications to le-
gitimately utilize them to ensure execution times in embedded and real-time systems.
In recent years, we have seen many advances by industry and academia to increase
the security of computer systems. Namely, we focus on TrustZone, a hardware-based
security extension developed by ARM to secure their processors which power a vast
majority of embedded systems. Evidently, just as security mechanisms have evolved,
so have the attacks and attackers that seek to circumvent them. CacheKit is a novel
approach that exploits the cache locking mechanisms offered on some ARM processors
to evade memory introspection from tools running in the Secure World of the pro-
cessor. This gives the rootkit a new level of unprecedented stealth that would leave
millions of devices using these processors severely vulnerable. By hiding in the Nor-
mal World cache of the processor, the new rootkit makes itself undetectable by any of
the defense mechanisms available today, including memory inspection. Furthermore,
by exploiting the virtualization extensions and modifying the physical address that
it maps to, it renders any possibility of malicious code recovery for forensic purposes
impossible. Therefore, we propose a novel solution that leverages the TrustZone ex-
tensions to prevent such an attack while still giving applications access to the timing
facilities offered by the processor.
The simplest solution described is to not allow application in the Normal World to
perform cache locking operations. However, as discussed, these are features that are
critical to the performance and timing requirements of real-time and many embedded
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systems. Therefore, disabling their use is not practical. After a detailed exploration
of the ARM architecture and attack features, we propose CacheLight which allows
the Normal World to perform cache locking through requesting it as a service from
the Secure World. All that is needed is the addition of a Secure Monitor Call to
the Secure World that will request it to lock a given address to a given cache way.
With a minimal increase in the Trusted Code Base to handle this SMC, the operating
system running in the TEE can then validate and verify the validity of this request
and prevent any malicious code from being hidden in the cache.
To verify the functionality of the defense approach, the Genode Operating Sys-
tem framework is deployed on the i.MX53 development board running the TZ-VMM
scenario to boot Linux in the normal world. The Linux kernel is modified to handle
four SMCs, to which we add our own call for the request to lock a certain cache
way. The address, cache way, and size of memory to load are passed as arguments
to the call. Upon world switch, the Secure World can now handle and verify the
validity of this call as it has all the necessary information. The VA to PA translation
registers are used to resolve the given virtual address to a physical address in system
memory. This address can then be verified to ensure actual data is being used. More
importantly, it ensures that there is no incoherence between the cache and RAM.
That is, whatever is in the given address in RAM will be stored and locked in the
cache, thereby ensuring that any data that will persist in the cache not only maps
to a valid address in memory but is also consistent with what was loaded to that
memory region, effectively bringing the contents of the cache to light. Therefore,
the memory introspection tools in the Secure World do not have to worry about not
being able to scan Normal World cache because we have ensured that the data is also
present in memory. Additionally, because the Secure World does not hand control
back to Normal World after verifying the address, but rather performs the loading
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and locking on behalf of the Normal World, the attacker cannot bypass the security
checks by passing different addresses in the arguments. The remapping of a virtual
address to a physical address in unused I/O memory provides a very strong attack
signature. Therefore, by doing security checks on the PA being locked into cache,
CacheLight can detect any anomalous behavior and if needed deploy inspection
tools.
Should CacheLight find that the attempt to lock the cache is malicious, it can
then flush the caches and run memory introspection tools to determine the nature of
the attack and retrieve any relevant data for forensic analysis. On the other hand,
if the request is determined to be legitimate, CacheLight can service it by taking
advantage of world-shared memory. By creating the necessary translation tables,
Secure World can access Normal World memory with an NS bit of 1 and therefore,
the loading will tag the cache entries with NS = 1. This way, when Normal World
attempts to use the locked entires, the TLB look-up will trigger a cache hit and the
data will be readily accessible as if the Normal World had made the entry.
Therefore, CacheLight can successfully prevent malicious code from hiding from
SW introspection tools in the NW cache for any significant amount of time. Note
that a compromised NW kernel would still be able to load malicious code into the
cache, however, recall that one of the essential requirements for this attack to work is
that the rootkit must remain persistent in cache long enough for it to be of use. This
cannot be achieved without the hardware-level cache locking mechanisms provided
by the processor. Therefore, any rootkit installed in the cache would be evicted from
the cache thereby rendering it useless.
In conclusion, CacheLight provides a lightweight and novel approach to pre-
venting a new generation of attacks to exploit the cache locking mechanisms provided
by processors. Additionally, while we present a solution for the ARM architecture,
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the approach can be generalized to any architecture that employs the same execution
separation idea. If the attack can be modified to a new architecture, then so can the
defense. Moreover, CacheLight incurs the overhead of a world-switch for the set-up
of the time-critical data. However, the initial setup of locking data in the cache is
already expected to be expensive so that the performance and timing requirements
can be met once the setup is done and the application running. CacheLight makes
additional overhead to the setup process but not the execution of the time-critical
process that requested the lock. Given that it provides security against an otherwise
undetectable attack, the trade-off in setup time is extremely worthwhile.
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